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CORPORATE

LAW-MERGERS AND DOUBLE DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:

THE NEW FRONTIER IN DERIVATIVE STANDING

Blasband v. Rales (1992)
I.

INTRODUCTION

A derivative action is one of a shareholder's primary instruments for
redressing corporate mismanagement.' To bring a derivative action in
2
Delaware, a shareholder must satisfy two fundamental requirements.
First, a shareholder must establish standing by proving that he or she
owned stock in the corporation at the time of the challenged transaction,
and continued to hold stock in the corporation throughout the litigation. 3 Second, a shareholder must either demand that the corporation's
board of directors initiate the action, or plead that such a demand would
4
be futile.
The explosion of corporate mergers in the 1980s complicated this
framework and, in many cases, eliminated a shareholder's ability to
1. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (acknowledging that
"derivative action is one method by which shareholders may obtain redress for
the misuse of managerial power"). In a shareholder derivative action, a plaintiffshareholder asserts, on behalf of the corporation, a claim belonging to the corporation. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (stating that "[a]
shareholder derivative suit is a uniquely equitable remedy in which a shareholder asserts on behalf of a corporation a claim belonging not to the shareholder, but to the corporation").
2. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1991) (providing standing requirement); DEL. CH. CT. C.P.R. 23.1 (providing demand requirement). For the text

of Delaware's standing requirement for shareholder derivative actions, see infra
note 3. For the text of Delaware's demand requirement, see infra note 4.
3. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1991). Section 327 states that:
In any derivative suit instituted by a stockholder of a corporation, it
shall be averred in the complaint that the plaintiff was a stockholder of
the corporation at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his stock thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law.
Id.; see also Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984) (commenting
that, in post-merger suits in which § 327 applies, Delaware courts have required
that shareholder not only own stock at time of challenged transaction but also
when suit is commenced and throughout litigation). For a further discussion of
Delaware's standing requirements, see infra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
4. See DEL. CH. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 provides that:
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors
or comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the
action or not making the effort.
Id.;see also Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 773 (Del. 1990) (stating that Rule
23.1 requires shareholders either to make demand on directors to initiate action
or to plead that demand would have been futile). For a further discussion of
Delaware's demand requirements, see infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.

(1194)
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bring a derivative action. 5 Specifically, mergers foreclosed derivative actions by interrupting the shareholder's continuous ownership in the premerger corporation, thereby preventing the shareholder from satisfying
6
the standing requirement.
In Blasband v. Rales, 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit bolstered the ability of shareholders to bring derivative
actions in a merger environment. 8 In Blasband, Easco Hand Tools
(Easco) entered into a merger agreement with Danaher Corporation
(Danaher).9 The agreement required shareholders of Easco to exchange their shares of Easco common stock for shares of Danaher common stock.' 0 Subsequent to the merger, Easco became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Danaher.II Interpreting Delaware law, the Third Circuit
held that the plaintiff-shareholder satisfied the continuous ownership requirement necessary to bring a derivative action challenging the merger
on behalf of Easco.' 2 However, the Third Circuit further held that the
5. See, e.g., Kramer v. Western Pacific Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 350-51
(Del. 1988) (holding that plaintiff who lost shareholder status through cash buyout merger could not maintain derivative action); Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1042 (holding that plaintiff who exchanged his ownership interest in original corporation
for shares in parent company, pursuant to merger agreement, lost ability to
maintain derivative action on behalf of original corporation); Bonime v. Biaggini, No. 6925, 6980, 1984 WL 19830, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1984) (holding
that plaintiff was unable to maintain derivative action on behalf of pre-merger
corporation when pre-merger corporation became wholly-owned subsidiary of
newly-formed parent company and plaintiff exchanged his shares in pre-merger
corporation for shares in newly-formed parent company), aff'd without opinion,
505 A.2d 451 (Del. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Kramer, 546 A.2d at 354-55 (noting that shareholder who relinquished ownership as result of cash buy-out merger failed to satisfy continuous
ownership requirement); Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1049 (stating that shareholder who
relinquished ownership in pre-merger corporation by exchanging his shares in
pre-merger corporation for shares in newly-formed parent company failed to
satisfy continuous ownership requirement); Bonime, 1984 WL 19830, at *2 (noting that shareholder who relinquished ownership due to merger after suit was
filed failed to satisfy continuous ownership requirement).
7. 971 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992).
8. Id. at 1044, 1046.
9. Id. at 1038.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 1046. The plaintiff actually filed the derivative action on behalf of
Danaher, the parent corporation. Id. at 1039. In effect, the action was "akin to a
double derivative suit." Id. at 1046. A double derivative action is where:
[tihe holding company owes a duty to use its control of the subsidiary
to sue to right wrongs to it, and the shareholder may in effect compel

specific performance of these connected duties in a double [derivative]
action ....

In a 'double derivative' action, the shareholder is effectively maintaining the derivative action on behalf of the subsidiary, based upon the
fact that the parent or holding company has derivative rights to the
cause of action possessed by the subsidiary. The wrong sought to be
remedied by the complaining shareholder is not only that done directly
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shareholder failed to adequately demonstrate demand futility. 13 Nevertheless, the court granted the shareholder leave to amend his complaint
to allege the additional facts necessary to establish the futility of a
proper demand. 14
This Casebrief first discusses the standing and demand requirements for shareholder derivative actions in Delaware,' 5 and sets forth
the facts and procedural history of Blasband v. Rales. 16 Next, this
Casebrief provides a detailed description of the Third Circuit's analysis
in Blasband.17 Finally, this Casebrief asserts that the Blasband decision
will facilitate shareholder derivative actions involving mergers, and suggests that, in Blasband, the Third Circuit effectively clarified the demand
requirement in Delaware, in the context of double derivative actions involving mergers. 18
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Standing

Under Delaware law, two elements are necessary to establish standto the parent corporation in which he or she owns stock, but also the
wrong done to the corporation's subsidiaries which indirectly, but actually, affects the parent corporation and its shareholders. Notwithstanding that the recognition of double derivative suits relaxes the plaintiff's
contemporaneous ownership requirement, the acceptance of the action
acknowledges the realities of the changing techniques and structures of
the modern corporation. The ultimate beneficiary of a double derivative action is the corporation that possesses the primary right to sue.
13 CHARLES R.P. KEATING & GAIL A. O'GRADNEY, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5977, at 240 (1991) (footnotes omitted). The
action was "akin to a double derivative suit" and not a true double derivative
suit because Blasband filed the action as a shareholder of Danaher, the parent
company, to "pursue a cause of action on behalf of Danaher's wholly owned
subsidiary, Easco," but Blasband was not a shareholder of Danaher at the time
of the challenged transaction. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1046.
13. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1055. Specifically, the court found that the shareholder failed to establish that the post-merger Easco board members existing at
the time of the challenged transaction continued to control the board at the time
the shareholder filed his complaint. Id.
14. Id.
15. For a discussion of the Delaware standing requirement for derivative
actions, see infra notes 19-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Delaware demand requirement for derivative actions, see infra notes 40-53 and
accompanying text.
16. For the facts and procedural history of Blasband, see infra notes 54-70
and accompanying text.
17. For a detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Blasband as to
the standing requirement, see infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Blasband as to the demand
requirement, see infra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the conclusions that the Blasband decision will facilitate derivative actions and clarify the Delaware demand requirement in the
merger context, see infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
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ing in a derivative action. 19 First, Delaware General Corporation Law
section 327 creates a statutory requirement that the plaintiff have been a
shareholder at the time of the challenged transaction. 20 The purpose of
section 327 is to prevent a plaintiff from purchasing shares of stock for
the sole purpose of bringing a derivative action. 2 1 Second, Delaware
courts additionally require that the plaintiff have been a shareholder at
the time he or she filed the complaint and that the plaintiff remain a
shareholder throughout the litigation. 22 This requirement prevents
abuses associated with derivative actions, such as shareholder "strike
suits,"2 3 and ensures that the plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the litigation to represent adequately the corporation's interest. 24 Thus, a plaintiff who sells his or her shares after filing suit loses standing to maintain
25
a derivative action.
19. See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984) (stating that
standing requires that plaintiff own stock at time of alleged wrong, at commencement of suit and throughout litigation). For a discussion of the elements
necessary to establish standing, see infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1991). For the text of § 327, see supra
note 3.
21. See Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 731 F. Supp. 643, 648 (D. Del. 1990)
(stating that primary purpose of § 327 is to prohibit plaintiffs from buying
shares of stock after alleged wrong has occurred for sole purpose of maintaining
lawsuit); Newkirk v. W. J. Rainey, Inc., 76 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. Ch. 1950) (acknowledging that purpose of § 51A of General Corporation Law of Delaware,
the predecessor statute to § 327, was to prevent individuals who seek to challenge corporate transactions from purchasing stock for sole purpose of bringing
derivative suit); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. Ch.
1948) (stating that purpose of § 51A,predecessor statute to § 327, was "to prevent what has been considered an evil, namely, the purchasing of shares in order
to maintain a derivative action designed to attack a transaction which occurred
prior to the purchase of the stock").
22. See Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Del. 1970) (citing
Hutchinson v. Bernhard, 220 A.2d 782 (Del. Ch. 1965)) (stating that plaintiff
must be shareholder when suit is commenced and throughout litigation); Lewis,
477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984) (noting that Delaware courts have consistently
required that shareholder own stock when suit is commenced and throughout
litigation); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974) (concluding
that "Delaware law seems clear that stockholder status at the time of the transaction being attacked and throughout the litigation is essential.").
23. See Harff, 324 A.2d at 218. A strike suit is a "[s]hareholder derivative
action begun with hope of winning large attorney fees or private settlements,
and with no intention of benefiting corporation on behalf of which suit is theo-

retically brought."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1423 (6th ed. 1990).

24. Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1046 (citing Harff 324 A.2d at 218) (noting that "[i]n
the context of a corporate merger, ....
a derivative shareholder must not only be
a stockholder at the time of the alleged wrong and at time of commencement of
suit but that he must also maintain shareholder status throughout the litigation"); Brambles, 731 F. Supp. at 648 (same).
25. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Bernhard, 220 A.2d 782, 784 (Del. Ch. 1965)
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for lack of standing,
because plaintiff sold her ownership interest after filing derivative action).
Courts have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 as imposing a
similar contemporaneous ownership requirement. Federal Rule 23.1 states that:
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A shareholder may also lose standing to sue derivatively if a merger
occurs. In the merger context, any plaintiff who loses shareholder status
because of a merger will generally lose standing to maintain the derivative action. 26 As the Delaware Court of Chancery stated in Schreiber v.
27

Carney:

[I]t is clear that a merger which eliminates a complaining stockholder's ownership of stock in a corporation also ordinarily
eliminates his status to bring or maintain a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation, whether the merger takes place
before or after the suit is brought, on the theory that upon the
merger the derivative rights pass to the surviving corporation
which then has the sole right or standing to prosecute the
28
action.
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or
members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a
right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member
at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the
plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have.
Id.; see, e.g., Portnoy v. Kawecki Berylco Indus., Inc., 607 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.
1979) (noting that Federal Rule 23.1 requires shareholder to hold interest until
end of litigation, ensuring that shareholder has adequate interest to vigorously
litigate claim). In addition, federal courts have employed the contemporaneous
ownership requirement of Federal Rule 23.1 to discourage "the collusive practice of transferring stock to a nonresident for the purpose of manufacturing federal diversity jurisdiction in order to litigate a pre-existing claim owned by the
corporation in a federal court." Brambles, 731 F. Supp. at 649 n.9 (quoting 7C
CHARLES C. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1828, at 64
(1986)).
26. Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1049. In Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that "[a] plaintiff who ceases to be a shareholder, whether by reason of a merger
or for any other reason, loses standing to continue a derivative suit." Id.; see
Bonime v. Biaggini, No. 6925, 6980, 1984 WL 19830, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7,
1984) (stating that "a plaintiff [who] loses his [or her] status as a shareholder
due to a merger which occurs after the suit is instituted also loses his [or her]
ability to maintain the derivative suit"), aff'd without opinion, 505 A.2d 751 (Del.
1985).
27. 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
28. Id. at 21. This rule developed from a line of cases interpreting Delaware General Corporation Law § 259(a) (formerly § 253(b)). Section 259(a)
provides in relevant part:
[Tihe rights, privileges, powers and franchises of each of said corporations, and all property, real, personal and mixed, and all debts due to
any of said constituent corporations on whatever account, as well as for
stock subscriptions as all other things in action or belonging to each of
such corporations shall be vested in the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or consolidation; and all property, rights, privileges, powers and franchises, and all and every other interest shall be
thereafter as effectually the property of the surviving or resulting cor-
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For example, in Lewis v. Anderson,2 9 the plaintiff-shareholder brought a
derivative action on behalf of Conoco, Inc. (Old Conoco).30 The shareholder's claim alleged that Old Conoco's directors acted improperly
when they approved certain employment contracts. 3 ' The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the continuous
ownership requirement and denied the plaintiff standing.3 2 Specifically,
the Lewis court found that the plaintiff failed to meet the continuous
poration as they were of the several and respective constituent corporations ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1991); see, e.g., Heit v. Tenneco, Inc., 319 F.
Supp. 884, 887 (D. Del. 1970) (stating that § 259 "provides that when a merger
becomes effective all assets of the merged corporation, including any causes of
action which might exist on its behalf, pass by operation of law to the surviving
company); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 767 (Del. Ch. 1964) (same).
In Braasch, shareholders of American Sumatra Tobacco Corporation (American Sumatra) filed a derivative action on behalf of American Sumatra. Braasch,
199 A.2d at 762. Pursuant to a merger agreement, American Sumatra merged
into Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (Tobacco Holdings), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
N.V. Deli Maatschappij, a corporation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Id.
Under the terms of the merger agreement, Tobacco Holdings offered to buy all
outstanding shares of American Sumatra at $17 per share. Id. None of the
plaintiffs, however, tendered their shares. Id. The Delaware Court of Chancery
dismissed the plaintiff's derivative claim challenging the merger, holding that
under § 253(b) (which was virtually identical to § 259(a)) the cause of action
passed to the surviving corporation, Tobacco Holdings. Id. at 767. Accordingly, the stockholders of American Sumatra lost their right to sue on its behalf.
Id.
In Heil, the District Court of Delaware reached the same conclusion. Heit,
319 F. Supp. at 884-85. A shareholder of J.I.
Case Company (Case) brought a
derivative action on its behalf to challenge an impending merger. Id. After the
shareholder filed suit, Case merged into and became Newcase, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Moorgate Corp., which was in turn a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Tenneco, Inc. Id. at 885-86. Pursuant to the merger agreements, the shareholders of Case received preferred stock of Tenneco. Id. Relying on Braasch and
§ 259(a), the District Court of Delaware held that, upon consummation of the
mergers, all causes of action owned by Case were transferred to the surviving
corporation, Newcase. Id. at 886-88. Because only Newcase could maintain the
derivative claim brought by the Case shareholder, the court held that the former
shareholder of Case no longer had standing to maintain the action. Id. at 88788.
29. 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984).
30. Id. at 1042.
31. Id. at 1041-42. The plaintiff claimed that the employment contracts
were "illegal, improper, without a valid business purpose, a fraud upon Old Conoco or a waste of corporate assets." Id. at 1042. These employment agreements, known as "golden parachutes," provided the corporate officers with over
five million dollars in benefits if Old Conoco was no longer listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, if 20% or more of Old Conoco's common stock was
purchased by outside interests, or if the officers were terminated from employment. Id. The "golden parachutes" were approved by an independent compensation committee on June 17, 1981, a little more than a month after a successful
cash tender offer by Dome Petroleum Ltd. (Dome) for 20% of the common stock
of Old Conoco. Id.
32. Id. at 1042.
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ownership requirement because Old Conoco had merged with a subsidiary of E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) and had formed
a wholly owned subsidiary (New Conoco).33 In the merger, the plaintiff
exchanged his shares of Old Conoco for shares of DuPont, the parent
company. 3 4 The Lewis court thus denied the plaintiff standing on the
basis that any derivative action the shareholders of Old Conoco had
against their directors was a property right of Old Conoco that passed to
5
the surviving company, New Conoco.3
33. Id. On June 25, 1981, a bidding war began for Old Conoco, and E.I.
DuPont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) emerged as the winner. Id. As a
result of the bidding contest, DuPont's wholly-owned subsidiary, DuPont Holdings, Inc., acquired Old Conoco thereby triggering the "golden parachutes." Id.
Subsequently, Old Conoco merged into DuPont Holdings, Inc., and the resulting corporation became New Conoco. Id.
34. Id. Plaintiff's claim did not involve the propriety of the DuPont-Conoco
merger, but rather, contested the pre-merger action of Old Conoco's board of
directors in approving the "golden parachute" employment agreements. Id. at
1042-43.
35. Id. at 1049-50. Because the plaintiff filed the derivative action prior to
the merger, the plaintiff argued that § 327 was irrelevant to the issue of "standing to continue the derivative action." Id. at 1045-46. The plaintiff argued that
§ 327 should be strictly construed and should only bar a derivative action
brought on behalf of Old Conoco after the merger, when the plaintiff was no
longer a shareholder of Old Conoco. Id. The plaintiff further contended that
since he filed the derivative action prior to the merger, Delaware General Corporation Law § 261, which governs the effect of mergers upon pending actions,
protected his standing to maintain the derivative action and preserved his right
to continue the derivative action on behalf of Old Conoco. Id. at 1046. Section
261 states that:
Any action or proceeding, whether civil, criminal or administrative,
pending by or against any corporation which is a party to a merger or
consolidation shall be prosecuted as if such merger or consolidation
had not taken place, or the corporation surviving or resulting from such
merger or consolidation may be substituted in such action or
proceeding.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261 (1991). Moreover, the plaintiff argued that by dismissing this claim, the court would leave a wrong unremedied. Id. at 1044.
Thus, the issue before the court was whether § 261 preserved the plaintiff's
standing to maintain a derivative action when, as a result of a merger, the plaintiff lost his status as a shareholder in the corporation on whose behalf the plaintiff had originally filed suit. Id. at 1047.
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments and held
that § 261 did not preserve the plaintiff's standing to continue the derivative
action. Id. at 1049. In support of this holding, the court reasoned that pursuant
to § 259(a), all rights of Old Conoco passed, as a result of the merger, to New
Conoco. Id. at 1050. For the text of § 259(a), see supra note 28. Moreover, the
court reasoned that such a construction of § 259(a) and § 261 was consistent
with the standing requirement in § 327, which the court stated applied to all
derivative actions filed before or after a merger. Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1046. In
addressing the plaintiff's argument that the denial of standing would leave a
wrong unremedied, the court stated that, pursuant to § 259(a) and § 261, the
board of directors of New Conoco had the right to determine the disposition of
plaintiff's claim. Id. at 1050 n.19. Accordingly, the directors of New Conoco
could still proceed against the management of Old Conoco if the directors of
New Conoco so desired. Id.
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Although continuous ownership is generally necessary to establish
standing to bring a derivative action, Delaware courts have recognized
two major exceptions to this rule. 3 6 First, continuous ownership is not
required when the merger is the subject of fraud.3 7 Second, continuous
ownership is not required if "the merger is in reality a reorganization
'3 8
which does not affect plaintiff's ownership of the business enterprise."
36. For a discussion of the exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement necessary to establish standing, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text.
37. Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1046 n. 10 (noting that exception to continuous ownership requirement exists when merger is fraudulent); see Kramer v. Western
Pacific Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354 (Del. 1988) (stating that merger is fraudulent if purpose of merger is to deprive shareholders of standing to maintain derivative suit); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 1970) (stating that
fraud exists when proposed merger is used for cover-up of wrongful acts of
management).
38. Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1046 n.10 (noting that "reorganization exception" to
continuous ownership requirement exists when merger constitutes reorganization which does not affect plaintiff's ownership interest); see Schreiber v. Carney,
447 A.2d 17, 22 (Del. Ch. 1982) (concluding that plaintiff had standing to maintain derivative suit when "the merger had no meaningful effect on the plaintiff's
ownership of the business enterprise"); Helfand v. Gambee, 136 A.2d 558, 55960 (Del. Ch. 1957) (upholding plaintiff's equitable right to sue derivatively on
behalf of corporation's interest despite subsequent reorganization, pursuant to
which plaintiff exchanged shares in former corporation for shares in new corporation). In Schreiber, the plaintiff brought a derivative action on behalf of Texas
International Airlines, Inc. (Texas International) challenging the propriety of a
loan from Texas International to the defendant, a related corporation. Schreiber,
447 A.2d at 18. After the plaintiff filed the action, Texas International merged
with and became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Texas Air Corporation. Id. at 19.
As a result of the merger, the plaintiff exchanged his shares in Texas International for an equal number of shares in Texas Air Corporation. Id. at 21. The
Delaware Court of Chancery held that the plaintiff had standing to maintain the
derivative suit on behalf of the pre-merger corporation because the post-merger
corporate structure was essentially identical to the pre-merger corporation. Id.
at 22. Thus, "the merger had no meaningful effect on the plaintiff's ownership
of the business enterprise." Id. The court further stated that the plaintiff's action was essentially a double derivative suit because the plaintiff possessed the
equitable right to sue derivatively for benefits on behalf of the pre-merger corporation's interests as they existed after the merger. Id. The action was not a
true double derivative action because the plaintiff was not a shareholder of the
parent company at the time of the challenged transaction. Id.
However, the Delaware Court of Chancery has refused to extend Schreiber to
corporate reorganizations which result in the shareholders of the pre-merger
corporation having a different ownership interest in the post-merger corporation. See, e.g., Bonime v. Biaggini, No. 6925, 6980, 1984 WL 19830, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 7, 1984), aff'dwithout opinion, 505 A.2d 451 (Del. 1985). In Bonime, the
plaintiffs were shareholders of Southern Pacific Company (Southern Pacific). Id.
at * 1. They brought a double derivative suit on behalf of Southern Pacific for
damages allegedly sustained by Southern Pacific's wholly-owned subsidiary,
Southern Pacific Transportation Corporation. Id. After the plaintiff filed the
action, Southern Pacific and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. entered into a merger
agreement and became wholly-owned subsidiaries of a new holding company,
Santa Fe-Southern Pacific Company (SFSP). Id. at *2. As a result of the merger,
the plaintiffs exchanged their shares of Southern Pacific for an equal number of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/12

8

Harvey: Corporate Law - Mergers and Double Derivative Actions: The New Fr

1202

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 1194

Alternatively, continuous ownership is not required for a plaintiff to
have standing to maintain an individual action if a plaintiff has cashed
out his or her ownership interest as a result of a merger, and he or she
39
seeks to attack directly a specific corporate transaction.
shares in SFSP. Id. The defendant-directors of Southern Pacific Transportation
Corp. moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to meet the continuous ownership requirement for standing. Id. The plaintiffs argued that they
had standing based upon Schreiber because they owned shares in a holding company formed for the purpose of effectuating a merger. Id. at *3. The Bonime
court concluded, however, that the Schreiber test is not "whether the surviving
corporation is deemed a holding company or an operating company but . . .
whether the surviving entity is merely the same corporate structure under a new
name or a new and different enterprise which has succeeded to the property
rights of constituent corporations." Id. The Bonime court thus distinguished
Schreiber on the grounds that in Bonime, Southern Pacific and SFSP had separate
boards of directors, officers, assets and stockholders. Id. Moreover, the court
found that the Bonime reorganization was more like the DuPont-Conoco merger
in Lewis v. Anderson than the merger at issue in Schreiber. Id. Therefore, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the
derivative suit because they failed to satisfy the continuous ownership requirement necessary for standing under § 327. Id. For a full discussion of the Lewis
decision, see supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
Similarly, in Helfand, the plaintiff was originally a shareholder in Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corporation, a New York corporation. Helfand, 136 A.2d at
560. However, as a result of a corporate reorganization, she exchanged her
shares in the New York corporation for shares in National Theatres, Inc. and
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation of Delaware, two Delaware corporations. Id. The plaintiff brought a derivative action on behalf of National Theatres, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary Fox Midwest Theatres, Inc.,
challenging actions by the directors of National Theatres, Inc. occurring both
before and after her stock ownership in National Theatres. Id. at 559. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the plaintiff had standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the Delaware companies for alleged wrongful acts
occurring prior to the merger and relating to the New York corporation. Id. at
561. The Helfand court stated that the purpose of § 327 was to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a derivative action based on transactions occurring prior to the
plaintiff's purchase of stock. Id. Although the plaintiff's derivative action in Helfand related to acts occurring prior to the reorganization and merger, the court
noted that the plaintiff's action did not offend the purpose of § 327 because the
post-merger corporation was a successor to the pre-merger corporation. See id.
(noting that plaintiff's stock transactions were pursuant to plan designed to
meet terms of consent decree related to antitrust action). The Helfand court further recognized that the plaintiff complained of acts preceding the incorporation
of one of the post-merger Delaware corporations, and that the post-merger corporation was merely a successor to the pre-merger New York corporation. Id. at
562. Thus, the court decided that the fact that the plaintiff held "two pieces of
paper rather than one as evidence of her investment" should not foreclose suit.
Id.
39. Kramer, 546 A.2d at 354 (holding that direct attacks against specific corporate transactions involving questions of fair dealing or fair price give shareholders standing to pursue actions individually even after shareholders have
relinquished ownership interest through merger); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1188-89 (Del. 1988) (holding that shareholders who relinquish ownership as result of merger may maintain individual actions alleging
claims of unfair dealing or breach of duty arising from merger).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 12

1993]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

B.

1203

Demand

To bring suit derivatively, a plaintiff must also satisfy the demand
requirement. 40 Under Delaware law, the plaintiff-shareholder must establish that he or she either adequately demanded that the board of directors initiate suit and the board refused to do so, or that such a
demand would have been futile. 4 1 This demand requirement recognizes
that the directors' duties in managing the business and affairs of a cor42
poration include handling litigation issues.
40. See DEL. CH. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. For the text of this rule, see supra note 4.
In diversity actions brought in federal district court, Delaware Chancery Court
Rule 23.1 remains applicable because the state law demand requirement is considered to be substantive rather than procedural, and the substantive law of the
state of incorporation governs the demand requirement. Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Services, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1716-17 (1991). Consequently, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1 applies only to evaluate the adequacy of the facts necessary
to satisfy the state's demand requirement, as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint.
Id. at 1716. For the text of Federal Rule 23.1, see supra note 25.
41. See DEL. CH. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. For the text of this rule, see supra note 4.
Delaware courts have long recognized the requirement of shareholder demand.
In 1935, the Delaware Chancery Court articulated the demand test as follows:
[The] stockholder has no right to file a bill in the corporation's behalf
unless it has first made demand on the corporation that it bring the suit
and the demand has been answered by a refusal, or unless the circumstances are such that because of the relation of the responsible officers
of the corporation to the alleged wrongs, a demand would be obviously
futile or, if complied with, it is apparent that the officers are not the
proper persons to conduct the litigation.
Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of Am., 180 A. 614, 615 (Del. Ch. 1935); see Stepak v.
Dean, 434 A.2d 388, 390 (Del. Ch. 1981); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251,
1262 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
42. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1984) (noting that demand requirement provides corporate-directors with "opportunity to rectify an
alleged wrong without litigation, and to control any litigation which does
arise"). The demand requirement is consistent with the fundamental principle
generally underlying the entire body of Delaware General Corporation Lawthat directors, rather than shareholders, manage all of the business and affairs of
the corporation. Id. at 811; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). Section
141(a) states, in relevant part, that "[tihe business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation." Id. Because a derivative action tends to impinge
upon the managerial freedom of a corporation's board of directors, the demand
requirement provides two essential safeguards for corporate management. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. First, the demand requirement ensures that a shareholder exhausts all intra-corporate remedies before circumventing the
managerial freedom of the directors. Id. Second, the demand requirement provides a safeguard against shareholder strike suits because it ensures, before any
litigation occurs, that the directors will have an opportunity to exercise reasonable business judgment with regard to initiating the suit. Id. at 812. Specifically,
this opportunity allows the directors to "waive a legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that [the corporation's] best interests will be promoted by not
insisting on such [a] right." Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Daily Income
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 533 (1984) (quoting Covbus v. Alaska Treadwell
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The plaintiff's demand on the board of directors must identify the
alleged wrongdoers, the factual basis of the wrongful acts, the harm
43
caused to the corporation, and must also include a request for relief.
If the plaintiff makes an adequate demand on the board of directors to
initiate the action and the board refuses, then the board's decision is
protected unless it constituted an invalid exercise of business judgment.4 4 Furthermore, if the demand is inadequate, a plaintiff may not
later claim that such a demand would have been futile. 45 Thus, a plaintiff must plead either that an adequate demand was made and refused or
that a demand would have been futile and was excused, but in no event
46
may a plaintiff plead both.
Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903))). Thus, the demand requirement
not only promotes recourse to a form of alternate dispute resolution as opposed
to immediate litigation, but also honors the broad discretion of directors in managing the business and affairs of Delaware corporations. Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812.
43. Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 (D. Del.),
aff'd, 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985).
44. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813; Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,
784 & n. 10 (Del. 1981). In Zapata, a shareholder instituted a derivative action on
behalf of Zapata Corporation against its officers and directors alleging breaches
of fiduciary duty. Id. at 780. The shareholder did not make a demand on the
board of directors to initiate the cause of action. Id. On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court clarified the demand requirements existing under Delaware law.
See id. at 781 (examining lower court's conclusion concerning right of stockholder to maintain derivative action). The Zapata court stated that when shareholders make a demand on the directors to initiate the suit and the directors
reject such a demand, the board's decision is protected by the business judgment rule and will be respected unless it violates the rule. Id. at 784 & n.10.
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the business judgment rule:
focuses on the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the
board's approval thereof. A court does not assume that the transaction
was a wrong to the corporation requiring corrective measures by the
board. Rather, the transaction is reviewed against the factual background of the complaint to determine whether a reasonable doubt exists at the threshold that the challenged action was a valid exercise of
business judgment.
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (1984). If the board's decision is a valid
exercise of judgment under the business judgment rule, then the board's refusal
of the shareholder's demand acts to terminate the shareholder's power to proceed with the derivative suit. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784; see Aronson, 473 A.2d at
813 (stating that if board's refusal is valid under business judgment rule then
"the shareholder lacks the legal managerial power to continue the derivative
action, since that power is terminated by the refusal").
45. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) (holding that after
stockholder makes demand, he or she "tacitly acknowledges the absence of facts
to support a finding of [demand] futility . . . [and the] question of whether demand is excused is moot"). The Spiegel court reasoned that is inconsistent for a
shareholder to demand that the board of directors bring an action, and then
subsequently claim that demand was excused. Id.
46. Allison, 604 F. Supp. at 1119 & n.12; Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 775. In Allison,
the court recognized that, in an appropriate case, a Delaware court might render
moot a plaintiff's claim that demand is excused if the plaintiff made a subsequent inadequate demand on the board of directors. Allison, 604 F. Supp. at
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If a plaintiff seeks to have the demand requirement excused on the
basis that such a demand would have been futile, the plaintiff must state
4 7 In Aronson v. Lewis, 4 8
particularized facts in support of such a claim.
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the test for determining demand
futility is "whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable
doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independ-

ent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a
valid exercise of business judgment.- 4 9 Although the Aronson court's articulation of this test seems to require that a plaintiff satisfy both prongs,

the demand futility reDelaware courts have held that a plaintiff meets
50
quirement if he or she meets either prong.
Under the first prong of the Aronson test, the plaintiff may demon-

strate reasonable doubt as to the independence of the directors by
showing that the transaction at issue was not approved by a majority
1119 & n.12. In Spiegel, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently adopted the
Allison court's reasoning and held that demand by a shareholder would defeat a
claim that demand was excused. Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 775. Courts have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 to impose an analogous requirement. See, e.g., Mozes v. Welch, 638 F. Supp. 215, 218-19 (D. Conn. 1986)
(holding that Federal Rule 23.1 requires that plaintiff either make demand on
the board or plead demand futility). For the text of Federal Rule 23.1, see supra
note 25.
47. See Stepak v. Dean, 434 A.2d 388, 390 (Del. Ch. 1981) (stating that
shareholder has burden of establishing particularized facts to support claim of
futility and noting that "conclusory allegation of [director] control [over corporation was] insufficient as a matter of law to excuse failure to make demand on
corporation"); Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of Am., 180 A. 614, 615 (Del. Ch. 1935)
(threatening to dismiss shareholder's complaint because it failed to allege demand upon, and refusal by, corporate directors to pursue cause of action which
shareholder sought to maintain derivatively).
48. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
49. Id. at 814. In Aronson, the plaintiff brought a derivative action on behalf
of Meyers Parking System, Inc. (Meyers) challenging certain transactions between Meyers and one of its directors, Leo Fink. Id. at 808. Fink owned 47% of
the outstanding stock of Meyers. Id. The principal allegation in the plaintiff's
complaint was that an employment agreement between Fink and Meyers was a
"waste of corporate assets" and had "no valid business purpose." Id. at 809.
The employment agreement provided that for a five year term, which was renewable automatically, Fink was "to advance Meyers' interests" in exchange for
$150,000 per year plus five percent of any pre-tax profits over $2,400,000. Id. at
808. If the agreement was terminated by either party, the agreement provided
that Fink would become a hired consultant for Meyers for $100,000 per year for
life. Id. At the time of the agreement, Fink was 75 years old. Id. at 809. The
plaintiff claimed that a demand that the board of directors challenge the employment agreement would have been futile because Fink had selected all of the
directors, and thus, controlled and dominated the entire board. Id.
50. See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619,624-25 (Del. 1984) (stating that
if plaintiff creates "a reasonable doubt as to either aspect of the Aronson analysis,
the futility of demand is established"). The Delaware Supreme Court later clarified its formulation of the demand futility test by changing the "and" to "or" in
the court's restatement of the standard in Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186
(Del. 1988).
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consisting of disinterested directors. 5 ' To satisfy the second prong of
the Aronson test, the plaintiff must allege particularized facts raising a
reasonable doubt as to whether the directors validly exercised business
judgment in the transaction at issue. 52 To determine whether the board
of directors exercised proper business judgment, courts examine both
53
substantive and procedural due care on the part of the directors.
51. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The Aronson court noted that in ascertaining
whether the directors were disinterested and independent, the reviewing court
should focus on the complaint's factual allegations. Id. at 814.
In Aronson, the plaintiff alleged that Fink dominated and controlled the
board because he owned 47% of the outstanding stock in the corporation and
had personally selected all of the directors. Id. at 815. The court held, however,
that proof of majority ownership of a company does not overcome the presumption of independence in favor of the directors. Id. The court further opined that
an allegation of control must include facts demonstrating that "through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden to the controlling person." Id.
52. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The Aronson court noted "that the transaction
is a wrong to the corporation requiring corrective steps by the board." Id. at
814. Rather, a court should substantively review a challenged transaction
against the factual background set forth in the complaint. Id. If a court thereby
determines that the plaintiff has alleged particularized facts which, if true, raise a
reasonable doubt that a board exercised valid business judgment, then demand
is excused. Id. at 815.
The Aronson test's second prong requires a reviewing court to focus on factual allegations existing at the time of the challenged transaction. Id. at 814-15.
The Delaware Chancery Court has noted that in establishing this requirement,
the Aronson court focused on the most common scenario, in which the board
existing at the time of the challenged transaction was the same board existing
when the complaint was filed. Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 230 (Del. Ch.
1990). The Harris court noted, however, that alternative scenarios are possible.
Id.
For instance, in Harris, a minority shareholder of Atlas Energy Corporation
(Atlas) brought a class action after a group of shareholder-directors sold a controlling interest in the corporation to Frederic Mascolo and then resigned, allowing Mascolo to appoint new directors to the Atlas board. Id. at 223-24. The
plaintiff later withdrew this class action and amended his complaint asserting
derivative claims on behalf of Atlas that included breaches of fiduciary duties.
Id. at 224. Because there was a change in the board between the plaintiff's filing
of the original and amended complaints, the Harris court was confronted with
the question of whether the plaintiff was required to show demand futility as of
the time of the amended complaint. Id. at 229. The Harris court held that the
original complaint was essentially derivative in nature, and that demand futility
must be determined as of the time of the original complaint. Id. The court also
held that if a derivative suit has been properly initiated before a change in the
board of directors, a plaintiff need not make an additional demand upon the new
independent board. Id. at 231. Moreover, the Harris court noted that a subsequent change in the board has no effect on the pleadings and suggested that it is
"[for this reason Aronson has been criticized as focusing the test for futility on
the wrong time." Id. at 229; cf Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d
1168, 1174-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (criticizing focus of
second prong of Aronson test because it fails to consider that disinterested, postmerger board of directors existing at time of filing of complaint could adequately assume managerial powers over litigation).
53. Starrels, 870 F.2d at 1171 (examining information possessed by direc-
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 1987, Alfred Blasband acquired 1,100 shares of stock in
Easco Hand Tools, Inc. (Easco). 54 On September 1, 1988, Easco made
a public offering of $100 million of 12.875% Senior Subordinated
Notes. 5 5 Easco violated the terms of the prospectus for the public offering by investing $61.9 million of the proceeds in junk bonds. 56 In its
December 31, 1989 Annual Report, Easco reported that the market
57
value of these junk bond investments had declined by $14 million.
Easco reported an additional $1 million loss in the March 31, 1990
Quarterly Report. 5 8
In February 1990, Easco entered into a merger agreement with the
Danaher Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Combo Acquisition Corporation (collectively, "Danaher"). 59 Easco and Danaher
shared two of the same corporate officers and directors. 60 As a result of
tors in order to evaluate procedural due care); Grobow, 539 A.2d at 189 (examining purchase terms in challenged transaction in order to evaluate substantive
due care). The plaintiff must allege specific facts relating to the financial and
economic circumstances of the challenged transaction to establish substantive
due care. Id. To establish procedural due care, the plaintiff must allege specific
facts describing what steps the directors failed to take to inform themselves or
what steps they could have taken to have been better informed before entering
into the challenged transaction. Starrels, 870 F.2d at 1172.
54. Blasband v. Rales, 772 F. Supp. 850, 852 (D. Del. 1991), rev'd, 971 F.2d
1034 (3d Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 1037. Easco's prospectus for the public offering indicated that the
corporation planned to use the proceeds of the sale to repay outstanding debt,
to finance both internal expansion and acquisitions, and for other general corporate purposes. Id.
56. Id. The prospectus indicated that until the proceeds were available for
the stated corporate purposes, the corporation would invest the proceeds in
government and other marketable securities bearing lower expected rates of return than the interest on the public offering. Id. Despite these statements in its
prospectus, Easco invested at least $61.9 million of the public offering proceeds
in high yield, high risk securities. Id. For the year ending December 31, 1988,
Easco disclosed these investments in its Form 10-K to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as "temporar[y] invest[ments] in marketable securities and cash equivalents." Id. (alterations in original).
57. Id. at 1038. Easco's Annual Report and Form 10-K for December 31,
1989 revealed that Easco still maintained these investments. Id. at 1037-38.
During the period from 1988 to 1989, however, the market for these securities
had declined, causing a loss of over $14 million. Id. at 1038. Easco stated that
further losses would be suffered even if the company sold the junk bond investments. Id. Easco explained that the decline in the value of these investments
was due to a volatile and "thinly traded market," and the greater risk associated
with these securities. Id.
58. Id. at 1037-38. In its March 31, 1990 Form I0-Q filed with the SEC,
Easco disclosed its additional losses. Id.
59. Id. The merger agreement provided that Easco shareholders would receive .4175 shares of Danaher common stock for each share of Easco common
stock. Id.
60. Id. Mitchell Rales, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Easco, owned
approximately 25% of Easco's common stock at the time of the merger. Id.
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the merger, Blasband received 458 shares of Danaher common stock. 6 1
As of June 1990, Easco survived as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
62
Danaher.
On October 25, 1990, Blasband's counsel sent a letter to the boards
of directors of Danaher and Easco highlighting the discrepancy between
the stated use of the public offering proceeds in the prospectus and the
actual use of the proceeds in the purchase of the junk bonds "and requesting additional information. ' 63 In response, Danaher and Easco
contended that because Easco had complied with all federal securities
laws and regulations, it would be inappropriate to provide the requested
information. 64 After receiving this response from Danaher and Easco,
Blasband filed a derivative action in the United States District Court of
Delaware on behalf of Danaher against Steven and Mitchell Rales and
twelve unnamed officers and directors of pre-merger Easco. 6 5 Blasband
claimed the Easco board of directors violated its fiduciary duties to
Easco by improperly investing the public offering proceeds in junk
bonds .66

The district court granted the defendant-director's motion to dismiss on two grounds. 67 First, the district court held that the merger
Steven Rales, Mitchell's brother, was also a member of Easco's board of direc-

tors and owned 27% of its common stock. Id. At the time of the merger, Mitchell Rales was also the president and director of Danaher and Steven Rales was

Chairman of the Board of Directors of Danaher. Id. Steven and Mitchell Rales
together owned 42% of Easco's common stock and 44% of Danaher's common
stock. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 1038.
63. Id. The letter requested: (1) an explanation as to why Easco invest-

ments had declined $14 million in one year; (2) a description of all securities

bought and sold by Easco between September 1, 1988 and December 31, 1989,

including pricing and brokerage information; (3) the names of Easco officers and
directors that approved or selected the purchases and sales; and (4) the reason
why Easco utilized the proceeds contrary to the investments set forth in the prospectus. Id.
64. Id. Danaher and Easco's response, dated December 17, 1990, indicated
that providing the requested information would be both time-consuming and
disruptive of the day-to-day management of the corporation. Id. at 1038-39.

65. Id. at 1039. In his complaint, Blasband named both Mitchell and Ste-

phen Rales as defendants, as well as 10 other individuals, who were officers and

directors of pre-merger Easco at the time of the public offering. Id. Because

Blasband brought the derivative action on behalf of Danaher, Danaher was
joined as a nominal defendant. Id.At trial in the district court, Blasband never
identified the ten unnamed defendants listed in the complaint; consequently,
Mitchell and Stephen Rales were the actual defendants in the suit. Id.
66. Id. Blasband alleged that the Rales brothers invested in the junk bond
market as consideration for Drexel Burnham's services in helping the Rales
brothers to establish a corporate acquisition strategy. Id. at 1039. Blasband
claimed that the use of proceeds in this manner was not for a legitimate corpo-

rate business purpose. Id.
67. Blasband v. Rales, 772 F. Supp. 850, 856-59 (D. Del. 1991), rev'd, 971
F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1992).
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interrupted the continuous ownership requirement necessary for standing. 68 Second, the district court held that demand futility should only
be assessed with regard to Danaher's board of directors, and that Biasband had failed to adequately plead such demand futility. 6 9 Conse68. Id. at 856-57. Blasband made five separate arguments in an effort to
fulfill the continuous ownership requirement necessary for standing. First, he
contended that Danaher had a right to sue because the Easco cause of action
passed to it as the corporation surviving the merger. Id. at 856. The district
court rejected this argument because Blasband's allegation itself acknowledged
that Easco survived as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Danaher. Id. Alternatively,
Blasband contended that Danaher, as Easco's sole shareholder, succeeded to all
of Easco's rights and responsibilities, including all derivative claims. Id. at 85657. The district court rejected this argument as well, noting that because Easco
survived the merger, Easco maintained control over all such rights. Id.
In his response brief, Blasband asserted a third ground for standing. Id. at
857. Blasband claimed that he had double derivative standing on behalf of
Danaher, in its capacity as the sole shareholder of Easco. Id. The district court
rejected this argument because Blasband failed to establish that Danaher was a
shareholder of Easco at the time of the challenged transaction. Id. At the hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss, Blasband raised a fourth argument for
standing. Id. Blasband contended that Danaher possessed a direct cause of action as a result of Danaher's breaches of fiduciary duty. Id. The district court
rejected this argument because the breaches of fiduciary duty asserted by Biasband would have depressed Easco's stock value, thereby offsetting any liability
Danaher might have acquired by becoming Easco's sole shareholder. Id. Finally, Blasband contended that he had standing because he continued to have an
indirect interest in Easco as a shareholder of Danaher. Id. Blasband cited the
United States Supreme Court decision of Gollust v. Mendell, 111 S. Ct. 2173
(1991), as support for his position. Blasband, 772 F. Supp. at 857. The district
court stated that Gollust did not apply because the Court had confined its analysis
in Gollust to standing under § 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
which did not require contemporaneous ownership. Id. Instead, the district
court found that the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Anderson,
477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984) was controlling. Id. at 857-58. Blasband had contended that Lewis should not control because the court in Lewis did not consider
an indirect standing theory. Id. The district court responded that although
Lewis did not directly address the issue of indirect standing, the Delaware Court
of Chancery had considered the argument following Lewis and had rejected it.
See Bonime v. Biaggini, No. 6925, 6980, 1984 WL 19830, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7,
1984) (rejecting indirect standing theory), aff'd without opinion, 505 A.2d 451
(Del. 1985). After considering all of Blasband's arguments, the district court
held that Blasband failed to satisfy the continuous ownership requirement necessary to establish standing. Blasband, 772 F. Supp. at 858-59.
69. Blasband, 772 F. Supp. at 855-56. Blasband argued that demand was
futile because Danaher denied all wrongdoing, refused to provide the information requested by plaintiff and refused to conduct any inquiry in response to
Blasband's letter. Id. at 855. Moreover, Blasband argued that by virtue of the
Rales brothers' ownership of 44% of Danaher's stock, the Rales brothers dominated and controlled the Danaher board. Id. Blasband posited that such domination and control of the board, coupled with the size of the junk bond
investments and the misleading statements in the prospectus, created a reasonable doubt as to whether the Easco board exercised sound business judgment.
Id. However, the court recognized that in order to establish demand futility, a
plaintiff must create a reasonable doubt as to the independence and disinterestedness of the board or as to whether the directors had employed sound business
judgment. Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)). The
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quently, Blasband appealed to the Third Circuit. 70
IV.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

A.

Standing

In Blasband v. Rales, the Third Circuit began its analysis by discussing the requirements and purpose of Delaware General Corporation
Law section 327. 7 1 The Third Circuit preliminarily noted that in order
to establish standing, section 327 requires a plaintiff to have been a
shareholder at the time of the challenged transaction, 72 and Delaware
courts require a plaintiff to have remained a shareholder at the time of
filing and throughout the suit. 73 The Third Circuit next articulated the
purpose of section 327, to prevent the "purchas[e] of shares in order to
maintain a derivative action designed to attack a transaction which oc74
curred prior to the purchase of stock."
The Third Circuit additionally noted that because a plaintiff ordinarily has no interest in a corporate recovery after a cash-out merger, he or
district court found that Blasband failed to create a reasonable doubt as to either
requirement. Id.
Specifically, applying the first prong of the Aronson test, the district court
held that Blasband's allegation that the Rales brothers' ownership of 44% of
Easco's outstanding stock allowed them to dominate and control the board was
insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the board was independent. Id. The
court reasoned that stock ownership alone is not sufficient to infer domination
and control, but rather that a plaintiff must plead particularized facts indicating
that the board of directors comports with the interests of an alleged controlling
party. Id. The district court further concluded the second prong of the Aronson
test was not met because the lack of business judgment alleged by Blasband was
on the part of Easco, and not the Danaher board, and because Blasband did not
allege the boards were identical. Id.
Blasband next argued that based upon Danaher and Easco's response to his
letter, any formal demand made by Blasband would have been refused. Id. at
855-56. The district court responded, however, that the test for demand futility
is not whether the board will respond to a demand affirmatively, but rather
whether the board has the managerial authority and legal capacity to consider
the demand disinterestedly. Id. at 856 (citing D. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 42.03[2], at 42-11 (1991)). Thus, the district

court concluded that Danaher and Easco's response to Blasband's letter failed to
establish demand futility, because it failed to raise any doubt as to the Danaher
board's ability to exercise its business judgment soundly. Id.
70. Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1039 (3d Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the matter to the district
court. Id. at 1055. Additionally, Blasband was given leave to amend his complaint, to allege demand futility and to add Easco as a party to the litigation. Id.
71. Id. at 1040-41. For the text of § 327, see supra note 3.
72. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1040; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1991).
73. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1040. For a discussion of the continuous ownership requirement imposed by Delaware courts, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
74. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp.,

60 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. Ch. 1948)).
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she lacks standing to bring a derivative action. 75 The court recognized,
however, that "where, as here, the plaintiff receives shares of a new corporate entity, the standing issue is less clear, as the plaintiff will have a
financial interest in the derivative action."' 76 The Third Circuit also
acknowledged that Delaware courts have consistently permitted a derivative action to proceed if the merger is, in reality, a mere
7
reorganization.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit commented that although the Delaware Supreme Court in Lewis v. Anderson had rejected standing in a
merger transaction similar to Blasband, the plaintiff in Lewis had not
75. Id. at 1041.
76. Id.

77. Id. The Third Circuit first discussed Helfand v. Gambee, 136 A.2d 558
(Del. Ch. 1957), which held that a plaintiff had standing following a merger because the merger was in reality a reorganization, and because the plaintiff's interest in the entity was unaffected. Id. at 562. Second, the court discussed
Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982), which held that a plaintiff
maintained standing because a "merger had no meaningful effect on the plaintiff's ownership in the enterprise." Id. at 22. The court stated that these cases
illustrate the Delaware courts' "reorganization exception" to the continuous
ownership requirement of standing. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1041. For a further
discussion of Helfand and Schreiber and the "reorganization exception" to the
continuous ownership requirement, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.

The Third Circuit also noted that these Delaware cases are wholly consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gollust v. Mendell, 11
S. Ct. 2173 (1991). Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1041 n.7. In Gollust, the plaintiff was a
shareholder of Viacom International, Inc. (Viacom) who commenced a derivative action under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, against various
insiders of Viacom to recover "short-swing profits." I I S.Ct. at 2176. Section
16(b) states, in relevant part, that:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer ...
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1992). "Short-swing profits" are profits earned by an insider, which includes directors and certain officers of the issuer, who trades on
non-public information. Gollust, I11 S.Ct. at 2178. After the plaintiff filed the
complaint, Viacom merged with another corporation, and the shareholders of
Viacom received a mixture of cash and stock of the newly formed parent company. Id. at 2176-77. Because the plaintiff owned stock in the parent company,
the Supreme Court held the plaintiff had an indirect, yet sufficient, financial interest in the litigation to satisfy the standing requirement under § 16(b). Id. at
2181.
While acknowledging that they were obligated to adhere to Delaware law,
the Third Circuit noted that Gollust was nevertheless instructive. Blasband, 971
F.2d at 1041-42 n.7. The court found the instructional value of Gollust to be
limited, however, because § 16(b), unlike Delaware § 327, does not require continuous ownership. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1992); Gollust, 111 S.Ct. at 2180.
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raised a claim of indirect financial interest.7 8 Accordingly, distinguishing Lewis, the Third Circuit concluded Lewis was not dispositive on the
issue of indirect financial interest in Blasband. 79 Instead, the Third Circuit observed that, in Sternberg v. O'Neil,80 the Delaware Supreme Court
had recognized "sub silentio" an indirect financial interest as a basis for
standing. 8 1 In Sternberg, the court permitted a plaintiff to bring a double
78. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1043-44. For a discussion of the facts and holding
of Lewis, see supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
79. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1043-44. The court distinguished Lewis on three
grounds. Id. First and most significantly, the Third Circuit observed that the
plaintiff in Lewis had asserted standing on behalf of the pre-merger corporation,
Old Conoco, and not the post-merger corporation, DuPont, of which the plaintiff was a shareholder. Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1041-42. In contrast, in Blasband, Blasband had asserted standing on behalf of Danaher, the post-merger parent
company of which the plaintiff was a shareholder. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1040.
Additionally, Blasband had asserted standing based upon the indirect financial
interest of a parent company in the affairs of its subsidiary. Id. at 1043.
Although Blasband had asserted that he possessed "successor derivative standing and not double derivative standing," the Third Circuit found no real distinction between the two. Id. at 1040, 1046 n.14. Thus, while the plaintiff in Lewis
had asserted "straight" derivative standing, Blasband had essentially asserted
double derivative standing. Id. at 1043; see Lewis, 477 A.2d at 1042. A second
factor distinguishing Lewis and Blasband was that the plaintiff in Lewis had made
no attempt to amend his complaint to assert double derivative standing. Biasband, 971 F.2d at 1043-44. In contrast, Blasband had brought a double derivative action at the outset. Id. Third and finally, the Third Circuit explained that
the Lewis court could not have implicitly rejected the plaintiff's standing to bring
a derivative action on behalf of the parent, DuPont, without foreclosing the
plaintiff's ability to bring a double derivative action. Id. at 1044. In order for
the Lewis court to have granted standing, it would first have had to decide
whether a shareholder could bring a double derivative action. Id. By contrast,
in Blasband, the Third Circuit began its analysis recognizing that the Delaware
Supreme Court after the Lewis decision recognized double derivative actions in
Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (1988). Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1042.
80. 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988).
81. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1042 ("[W]e believe that the Delaware Supreme
Court sub silentio recognized an indirect financial interest as a basis for standing
in 1988 when in Sternberg v. O'Neil, apparently for the first time, it permitted a
plaintiff to pursue a double derivative suit.") (citation omitted)). Various Delaware courts other than the Delaware Supreme Court had recognized double derivative standing prior to Sternberg. See, e.g., Bonime v. Biaggini, No. 6925, 6980,
1984 WL 19830, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1984) (stating that plaintiffs' action
involved double derivative claims), aff'd without opinion, 505 A.2d 451 (Del.
1985); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22 (Del. Ch. 1982) (holding that plaintiff had standing following reorganization merger and stating that plaintiff's "action [was] really a double derivative suit"); Levine v. Milton, 219 A.2d 145, 146
(Del. Ch. 1966) (recognizing that plaintiff had standing in double derivative
suit).
The real issue in Sternberg, however, was not whether the Delaware Supreme
Court would recognize double derivative standing, but rather whether the Delaware courts could exercise in personam jurisdiction over an Ohio corporation.
Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1109. The jurisdiction issue was particularly important
because in a double derivative suit, both corporate parties are indispensable to
the action. Id. at 1124. In Sternberg, a shareholder of GenCorp Inc. (GenCorp),
the parent company, brought a double derivative action against GenCorp, RKO
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derivative action, 8 2 which is "brought on behalf of one corporation (e.g.
a parent) to enforce a cause of action in favor of a related corporation
(e.g. its subsidiary)." ' 8 3 The Third Circuit reasoned that because the
Sternberg plaintiff's stake in the litigation was sufficient to confer standing
and because that interest was no greater than Blasband's, Blasband also
84
had a sufficient indirect interest to satisfy the standing requirement.
Consequently, the Third Circuit concluded that Blasband satisfied the
continuous ownership requirement and had standing to maintain the de85
rivative suit.
General, Inc. (RKO), GenCorp's wholly-owned subsidiary, and certain officers
and directors of both corporations. Id. at 1108. GenCorp was an Ohio corporation, while RKO was a Delaware corporation. Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that GenCorp had sufficient contacts
with Delaware to create in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 1125-26. The court decided to extend jurisdiction based upon the need to provide a "forum for shareholder derivative litigation involving the internal affairs of its domestic
corporations." Id. at 1125.
82. Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1124-25.
83. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1042-43. For a further description of double derivative actions, see supra note 12.
84. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1043. The Third Circuit specifically stated:
The plaintiff's personal stake in the litigation in Sternberg-which was
sufficient to confer standing-was no greater than Blasband's stake in
this action. Blasband continues to own shares in Danaher, the parent
of the corporation, Easco, that has the primary right to sue to redress
the wrongs asserted in his complaint and thus he has an indirect financial interest in the litigation.
Id. The defendants in Blasband unsuccessfully argued that Blasband's interest
differed from that of the plaintiff in Sternberg. In Sternberg, the parent company,
GenCorp, owned the subsidiary at the time of the transaction challenged by the
plaintiff, and remained the subsidiary's owner throughout the time the plaintiff's
complaint was filed and litigated. Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1108. In Blasband, however, Danaher did not own Easco until after the occurrence of the transaction
challenged by Blasband. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1037-38. Thus, the shareholder
in Sternberg arguably had a stronger interest because the parent company had an
ownership interest both at the time of the challenged transactions and throughout the litigation. See Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1108. In Blasband, by contrast,
Danaher only had an ownership interest in Easco at the time the complaint was
filed. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1037-38. In rejecting this argument, the Third Circuit reasoned that because Blasband was a shareholder of Easco at the time of
the challenged transaction, he, rather than Danaher, satisfied the "ownership at
the time of the challenged transaction" component of the standing requirements. Id. at 1043, 1046 & n.14.
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected reasoning similar to that adopted by
the Third Circuit in favor of applying the reorganization exception to standing.
See, e.g., Bonime, 1984 WL 19830, at *3. The Bonime court emphasized the necessity of a common identity between the parent and the subsidiary. Id. If the parent and the subsidiary had separate boards, officers, assets and stockholders, the
Bonime court opined that the "reorganization exception" would not apply and
the plaintiff would lack standing. Id. For a discussion of the "reorganization
exception" to the continuous ownership requirement, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1044. Moreover, the court noted that because
Blasband was a shareholder at the time of the alleged inappropriate investment,
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Finally, the Third Circuit noted that both Easco and Danaher had
refused to assert the Easco claim following the merger. 86 Recognizing
that Delaware courts have widely permitted shareholders to sue on behalf of the company when the board refuses to assert the claim, 8 7 the
Third Circuit determined that Blasband should have been allowed the
88
opportunity to assert the Easco claim himself.
B.

Demand

In discussing the demand requirement, the Third Circuit first recognized that Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 requires that a plaintiff
either make an adequate demand on the board of directors which is refused, or show that such a demand would have been futile. 89 Because
Blasband did not plead that an adequate demand was made on either
the Danaher or Easco board of directors, the Third Circuit limited its
analysis to demand futility. 90
as required by § 327, he had clearly not purchased shares in order to initiate a
strike suit. Id. at 1043; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1991). The Third Circuit reasoned the "literal requirements as well as the purposes underlying both
components of shareholder derivative standing-ownership at the time of the
challenged transaction and continuing ownership during the litigation"-were
satisfied under Delaware law. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1043. The Third Circuit
noted, however, that this decision might "not fit neatly into existing Delaware
corporation law." Id. at 1044.
86. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1044.
87. Id. The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized that directors have exclusive control over the business and
affairs of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); Blasband,
971 F.2d at 1044 (citing Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1050 n.19 (Del.
1984)). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit additionally noted the Supreme Court of
Delaware's consistent recognition of a shareholder's right to sue on the corporation's behalf if the board of directors has failed to assert a claim properly belonging to it. Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
Moreover, the Third Circuit indicated a shareholder may assert a claim that the
directors refuse to assert, if the shareholder can prove that demand was futile or
was wrongfully refused based upon the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Stepak
v. Dean, 434 A.2d 388, 390 (Del. Ch. 1981) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish demand futility); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(holding that demand was made by plaintiff and wrongfully refused by board of
directors), rev d on other grounds sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779 (Del. 1981). According to the court, however, this shareholder right is a
right arising from the concept of demand and is not a component of standing.
See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-14 (stating that shareholders may bring derivative
action only after satisfying requirements of demand).
88. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1044.
89. Id. at 1048; see DEL. CH. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. For the text of Rule 23.1, see
supra note 4. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the
demand requirement "exists at the threshold, first to insure that a stockholder
exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a safeguard against
strike suits." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984). For a full discussion of the demand requirement, see supra notes 40-53 and accompanying
text.
90. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1048.
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In evaluating demand futility, the Third Circuit applied the Aronson
two-part test. 9 1 Under the first prong of the test, the court reviewed the
complaint's factual allegations to ascertain whether a reasonable doubt
existed as to the disinterestedness and independence of the Easco and
92
Danaher boards of directors at the time Blasband filed the complaint.
Blasband argued the boards' response to his inquiry about the use of the
public offering proceeds indicated that any further demand would have
been futile. 93 In reply, the defendants argued that a response to an inadequate demand should not be used as evidence of demand futility for
two reasons. 9 4 First, the defendants argued that the use of an inadequate demand to substantiate demand futility would reduce the demand
requirement to a mere formality. 95 Second, the defendants argued that
Easco and Danaher's response did not cast a reasonable doubt on the
boards' inability to consider a pre-suit demand. 9 6 The Third Circuit rejected the defendants' first argument, opining that any use of the de91. Id. at 1048-55. For a full discussion of the Aronson test, see supra notes
48-53 and accompanying text. Initially, the Third Circuit had to determine to
which board of directors the Aronson test was properly applied. Id. at 1049. The

district court had held that an analysis of demand futility should focus only on
the Danaher board's business judgment at the time the complaint was filed.
Blasband v. Rales, 772 F. Supp. 850, 855 (D. Del. 1991). The Third Circuit
disagreed. Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1049 (3d Cir. 1992). Specifically,
the court reasoned that because the case was essentially a double derivative action, the demand required of a plaintiff in such an action should apply to Blasband. Id. at 1050. The court noted that a plaintiff in a double derivative suit
must make a demand twice, upon the parent and also the subsidiary. Id. (quot-

ing KEATING & O'GRADNEY, supra note 12, at 13). The Third Circuit further
noted that although no Delaware court had considered the demand requirement
necessary in a double derivative suit, demand upon both the parent and the sub-

sidiary seemed consistent with the Delaware policy of preventing shareholders
from impinging on the managerial freedom of directors. Id. at 1050. Consequently, the court imposed this double derivative requirement upon Blasband.
Id.
92. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1050-52; see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814
(Del. 1984). In Blasband, the Third Circuit noted that directorial interest exists
when a director's loyalties are divided or when he or she stands to reap personal
financial gains from a transaction not equally benefitting the shareholders. Biasband, 971 F.2d at 1048 (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984)
and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
93. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1048. Blasband argued that the board's response
demonstrated that any demand would be futile because the board denied all
wrongdoing, refused to provide easily obtainable information and refused to
conduct an investigation. Id. Moreover, Blasband argued that the response
demonstrated the Danaher board's complete unwillingness to inquire into the
Rales brothers' conduct. Id.
94. Id. at 1050-52.
95. Id. at 1050. The defendants argued that a shareholder could circumvent the demand requirement by making an inadequate demand, and then using
the response to the inadequate demand to show the futility of the demand. Id.
96. Id. at 1051-52. The defendants argued that the Easco and Danaher's
response stated that Easco had complied with its disclosure requirements as required under federal securities law, and gave no indication of whether a potential claim for breach of fiduciary duty existed. Id. at 1051. Thus, the defendants
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fendants' response as evidence was irrelevant because plaintiff bore the
burden of proof.97 The Third Circuit agreed with defendants' second

argument, however, and held that the defendants' response did not raise
98
a reasonable doubt of director independence.
After determining that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the first prong of
the Aronson test, the court next examined the second prong of the test.9 9
The second prong requires the plaintiff to show that the board of directors invalidly exercised its business judgment in the transaction. l0 0 The
Third Circuit noted that the second prong of the Aronson test focuses on
the board in office at the time of the challenged transaction, which in
Blasband was the pre-merger Easco board.' 0 ' After reviewing the complaint, the Third Circuit held that Blasband had sufficiently pleaded
facts demonstrating that the pre-merger Easco board was incapable of
validly responding to a demand. 10 2 However, the Blasband court ac3
knowledged a problem with focusing on the pre-merger Easco board. 10
The court commented that the relevant inquiry was not whether the
transaction was approved by the board exercising reasonable business
judgment, but rather, whether the present board had the legal and managerial capacity to control corporate litigation. 10 4 The court reasoned
argued that the letter did not raise a reasonable doubt that the board was disinterested. Id.
97. Id. at 1051. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff always retains the
burden of demonstrating reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of the
directors, and that the plaintiff's use of such a response does not lessen the
plaintiff's burden. Id.
98. Id. at 1052. The court held that the defendants' failure either to provide information or to take action did not raise a reasonable doubt that the defendants were disinterested. Id.
99. Id. at 1052-55.
100. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). For a discussion
of the second prong of the Aronson test, see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
101. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814; Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1052 (3d
Cir. 1992).
102. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1052. The Third Circuit held, assuming that the
allegations in the complaint were true, that Blasband established a reasonable
doubt as to whether the use of the proceeds from the public offering was a valid
exercise of business judgment. Id.
103. Id. at 1054.
104. Id. The Delaware Chancery Court had previously addressed this issue
in Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 230 (Del. Ch. 1990):
In the special case, however, where there is a change in board control
between the date of the challenged transaction and the date of suit, it
might open the way to error to focus on the board existing at the time
of the challenged transaction. What, in the end, is relevant is not
whether the board that approved the challenged transaction was or was
not interested in that transaction but whether the present board is or is
not disabled from exercising its right and duty to control corporate
litigation.
I do not consider that Aronson intended to determine that demand
under [Delaware Court of Chancery] Rule 23.1 upon an independent

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 12

1993]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

1217

that even though Blasband had satisfied the second prong of the Aronson
test as to the pre-merger Easco board, the focus of the Aronson inquiry at
the time of the transaction would be rendered irrelevant if control of
Easco's board had changed.' 0 5 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded
that demand futility would only be satisfied as to the Easco board "[i]f
Blasband [could] show upon remand that a controlling group of Easco
board members existing at the time of the challenged transactions con06
tinued to control the board at the time he filed his complaint.'
V.

IMPACT

In Blasband v. Rales, the Third Circuit strengthened the plaintiffshareholder's ability to bring a derivative action. As a result of this decision, plaintiffs currently maintain a competitive advantage in litigating
claims in the Third Circuit forum rather than in Delaware state courts.
Blasband sets important precedent in two respects. First, Blasband established that a plaintiff-shareholder may bring a double derivative suit on
behalf of a parent company for alleged wrongs to a subsidiary where the
plaintiff was not a shareholder of the parent at the time of the alleged
wrongs and only became a shareholder of the parent through a
merger. 10 7 By allowing the plaintiff to bring such a double derivative
suit and establish standing, the Third Circuit relaxed the continuous
ownership requirement. This change is important because earlier, a
shareholder who had exchanged his or her shares in a merger failed to
board that has come into existence after the time of the 'challenged
transaction' would be excused if the board that approved the challenged transaction did not qualify for business judgment protection.
Id. at 230. The Harris court did not establish an absolute rule that demand futility should be measured at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at 231. Rather,
the court held that once a derivative suit is initiated, the plaintiff need not make
a new demand upon the board if he or she subsequently seeks to amend the
complaint to assert additional claims, even if the board's composition changes.
Id. For a complete discussion of the facts and holding of Harris, see supra note
52.
105. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1054-55.
106. Id. The Third Circuit thus vacated the district court's order on the
standing issue. Id. at 1055. Regarding the demand issue, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court with leave to add Easco as a party to the
suit, and to determine whether the Easco board changed in composition from
the time of the challenged transaction to the time of the filing of the complaint.
Id.
107. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1046. This result is inconsistent with established
Delaware law, which recognizes that the reorganization exception to the continuous ownership requirement may only be applied if the post-merger corporation
is virtually identical to the pre-merger corporation. See, e.g., Bonime v. Biaggini,
No. 6925, 6980, 1984 WL 19830, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1984) (denying use of
reorganization exception where new corporation had identity significantly different than old corporation), aff'd without opinion, 505 A.2d 451 (Del. 1985); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 22 (Del. Ch. 1982) (applying reorganization
exception where new corporation was identical to old corporation).
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satisfy the continuous ownership requirement necessary for standing.' 0 8
Significantly, the Third Circuit's opinion is sensible when the postmerger corporation is identical to the pre-merger corporation.' 0 9 If,
however, the post-merger entity has different directors, officers, assets
and stockholders, the logic of Blasband is not as sound.' 10 If the two
corporations are different, the plaintiff-shareholder may not possess a
sufficient interest in litigating a claim for a corporation in which he or
she is no longer a shareholder. " l,
Second, in Blasband, the Third Circuit clarified the demand requirements necessary in double derivative suits involving mergers." ' 2 The
Blasband court reinforced the proposition that the focus of the second
prong of the Aronson test is properly upon the corporation at the time of
the challenged transaction.' 13 If at the time the complaint is filed the
composition of the board of directors has changed, under Blasband, the
plaintiff must also show demand futility as to that board."1 4 This rule
will force the post-merger corporation's board of directors to assume
responsibility for a pre-merger corporation's actions.' 15 Moreover, the
post-merger corporation, in order to avoid a derivative suit, must determine whether the post-merger corporation's interests would be fur6
thered by not pursuing the action." 1
Christopher M. Harvey
108. For a full discussion of the continuous ownership requirement, see
supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Schreiber, 447 A.2d at 22 (applying reorganization exception to
continuous ownership requirement where new corporation is identical to old
corporation).
110. See, e.g., Bonime, 1984 WL 19830, at *3 (rejecting use of reorganization
exception to continuous ownership requirement where new entity had "corporate mix" that was distinctively different than new corporation).
111. For a discussion of the importance of having a sufficient stake in the
litigation to bring the derivative action, see supra notes 21, 23, 24 & 26 and
accompanying text.

112. Blasband, 971 F.2d at 1050.
113. Id. at 1052.
114. Id. at 1054-55.
115. Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 229-30 (Del. Ch. 1990). The Harris
court described this responsibility as "whether the [post-merger corporation's]
board [of directors] is or is not disabled from exercising its right and duty to
control corporate litigation." Id. at 230.
116. See, e.g., R. Franklin Balotti et al., Defense of Derivative Claims, in 2 SECURITIEs LITIGATION 1990, at 77, 93 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 400, 1990) ("As a theoretical matter there is little jusitification in
requiring the court to examine the prior board or its action because even if the
action challenged was not the product of a valid exercise of business judgment,
the current board might well determine that the corporation's interests would be
best served by not pursuing the cause of action.")
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